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‘Vitality shows in not only the ability to persist but the ability to start over.’ 
(F Scott Fitzgerald) 
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Abstract  
 
A topic of discourse for over half a century, the Societas Europaea (the European Company)i has 
much to offer. Notwithstanding its merits, this supranational corporate form has attracted much 
criticism. One of the major issues that has emerged on a recurrent basis is the question of the 
functional worth of this structure. In this context a discourse has ensued about its advantages, and 
disadvantages from the perspective of its intended end-user.  
 
This paper will discuss the pro-business aspects of this entity (Part 2) before giving due consideration 
to its structural and functional deficits (Part 3), ending with suggestions for reform (Part 4). 
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1. Introductioniiiiiiv 
 
Confronted with the realisation that there was a need for a European stock corporation that would be 
governed by a single body of law irrespective of the locus of its seat, possessing the same rights and 
powers endowed upon national corporations by their respective countries,v economic exigency 
dictated the existence of such an ‘international company’.vi  
 
Between the instance when the idea of a European Company was first raised,viiviii and the 
inception of this structureixx however almost half a century had elapsed.  
 
2. Pro-business Aspects of the SE  
 
Without any doubt the SE opens a new era in responding to the specific needs of multinationals, but 
what are the advantages of the SE in comparison to national corporate forms? Why should a 
multinational opt for the formation of an SE? This section will address these questions by highlighting 
the key advantages of the SE. 
 
Functionality and the Economic Efficiency of the SE as a transnational corporate vehicle 
 
Prior to the establishment of the SE, companies engaged in cross-border operations needed to remain 
based in one Member State, and had to cope with the difficulties and transactional costs associated 
with having to comply with the national company laws of the various Member States within which 
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they operated. It was almost impossible for companies based in different Member States to merge, and 
it was impossible for a company with a registered office in one Member State to move this office to 
another Member State without being subjected to ‘a suicide’ liquidation.xi  
 
The main advantages associated with the SE from a business point of view are accessibility to 
a post-national corporate form with a 'transnational home base'xii enjoying limited liability (though the 
European Economic Interest Grouping proposes certain functional features, its key drawback is its 
lack of limited liabilityxiii) with a unified management system, and financial reporting rules, which 
may be used in order to maintain offices in different Member States, thereby avoiding the need to 
establish a costly, time-consuming, and complex network of affiliated companies governed by the 
national laws of the different Member States.xivxv  
 
What is more, the SE is only answerable to one supervisory authority (in the Member State 
where it is registered) rather than several (in the different Member States where the company has 
subsidiaries).xvi The estimated annual saving in this context is in excess of thirty billion Euros.xvii 
  
Cross-border Mobility 
Notwithstanding the fact that the SE is a creature of national law possessing all the hallmarks of a 
public limited liability company of the Member State in which it has its registered office, it is endowed 
with European legal personality as well as ‘unequalled freedom of movement.’xviii  
 
In the context of mobility, a distinction can be made between 1) reincorporation (cross-border 
transfer of seat), and 2) cross-border merger. 
 
1) Reincorporation (cross-border transfer of seat) 
 
One of the key advantages associated with the SE form is its ability to engage in cross-border seat 
transfers (reincorporation).xixxx It is able to move from one Member State to another whilst ‘fully 
retaining its legal personality’xxi ensuring that the act of reincorporation does not affect the continuity 
of its legal personality.xxii This procedure available to SEs allows for ‘post-incorporation transfers of 
the registered office without winding up’,xxiii permitting SEs to freely change ‘the legal regime to 
which they are subject by moving both registered office and head office’.xxiv  
 
 Many jurisdictions condition cross-border transfer of the registered office of one of its 
companies on the loss of legal personality.xxv So that a company looking to transfer its registered 
office will be forced to liquidate in its jurisdiction of incorporation before the transfer takes place, 
which in turn necessitates the incorporation of a new company in the jurisdiction to which the 
company seeks to relocate (target jurisdiction).xxvi The act of liquidating (in the jurisdiction of 
incorporation) typically entails tax consequences,xxvii whilst the act of (re)incorporating (in the target 
jurisdiction) is both time-consuming and costly.  
 
 In contrast, with domestic corporate forms, the SE is able to transfer its seat from one Member 
State to another whilst fully retaining its legal personality meaning that the cross-border seat relocation 
will take place without the need to wind-up (in the Member State of incorporation), and to re-
incorporate (in the target Member State).xxviii  
 
This supranational corporate vehicle, which is operational on both the national and 
international spheres, enjoys the ability to migrate with relative ease. It may leave its country of 
inception in order to settle permanently or temporarily in another Member State. If it so wishes, it is 
free to relocate countless times throughout the EU. Its capacity to emigrate, and its ability to 
immigrate are rooted in supranational law.xxix 
 
The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the freedom of 
establishment has arguably taken some of the shine off this feature.  
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Building on the decision in Centrosxxx the CJEU has enhanced the freedom of establishment, 
and ‘has moved the European legal scene towards mutual recognition of companies.’xxxi  
 
Notwithstanding the far-reaching implications of its decisions in Centros, and Überseeringxxxii 
the CJEUxxxiiixxxiv has said that the Member State of incorporation may still impose certain restrictions 
on the transfer of the registered office.xxxv  
 
2) Cross-border Merger 
 
The possibility of a cross-border merger was an advantage associated with the SE until the adoption of 
the Cross-border Merger Directivexxxvi permitting all limited liability companies to proceed with cross-
border mergers with conditions that are comparable to those of the SE.xxxvii 
 
Pre-2005 most Member States did not permit a company of one Member State to merge with a 
company of another. And even where such a merger was legally possible under national law, there 
were still major obstacles to be surmounted such as tax regimes of the countries concerned.xxxviii 
 
In order to address the hindrances to concentration of undertakings into larger units capable of 
operating across the whole of the EU, rather than merely within the borders of one Member State, and 
in the absence of a European instrument permitting international merger or consolidation without prior 
liquidation of the company to be absorbed by a foreign company, the SE was intended to be used an 
instrument by national companies looking to consolidate.xxxix The SE enabled such national companies 
to consolidate into an SE avoiding the need for prior liquidation. By forming an SE, groups could 
restructure themselves by converting their subsidiaries, from at the moment 31 states with 31 different 
jurisdictions, into establishments as a result of a cross-border merger.xl 
 
Why would a multinational opt for a complex, time-consuming and costly SE restructuring 
with a high degree of legal uncertainty, when it could merge in the same way using national law, 
especially when bearing in mind the following facts?  
 
Firstly, the Cross-border Merger Directive is open to all limited liability companies whereas 
the SE Regulation is only applicable to public limited liability companies.  
 
Secondly, the Cross-border Merger Directive is more flexible than the SE Regulation, 
permitting ‘letter-box’ companies with third country origins to take the advantage of such a facility 
(the SE Regulation requires forming companies to have their registered office within the Union, unless 
the Member State allows otherwise).xli  
 
Thirdly, the Cross-border Merger Directive contains more relaxed provisions in relation to 
employee participation than the SE Regulation (with a threshold of one-third, rather than the threshold 
of 25 per cent associated with the SE). If a negotiated solution fails, the more stringent co-
determination standard only applies if at least one third of the employees participating in the merger 
are subject to this standard.xlii 
 
Notwithstanding the appeal of the Cross-border Merger Directive, arguably the SE as a 
corporate structure adds value to multinationals by combining all the techniques of corporate mobility 
in one package (cross-border mergers, transfer of the registered office, and fiscal neutrality for cross-
border transactions).xliii 
 
Choice of Corporate Management Structure 
 
The founders of the SE are free to select their management structure.xliv As such they may incorporate 
using a one-tier management structure (where management is entrusted exclusively to the 
administrative organ), or a two-tier management structure (with a management organ responsible for 
managing the company, and a supervisory organ entrusted with oversight).xlv  
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Pursuant to the SE Regulationxlvi those countries that do not know the two-tier system, or 
rather, do not have suitable legal norms, have the option of adopting such measures in relation to 
SEs.xlvii This applies respectively to countries that do not know the one-tier system.xlviii An illustration 
of this can be found in Germany, which adopted provisions applicable to SEs governed by a one-tier 
system, through Articles 20 - 49 SEAG.xlix  
 
Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. The main disadvantage of the one-tier 
system is the potential that insiders or even the CEO of the company will capture the board in order to 
retain their jobs, and maintain control of the company.l Whereas one may say that this risk is lower in 
a two-tier system as the members of the supervisory board are more independent.li However, the one-
tier system facilitates a more flexible forum for decision-making relative to the two-tier system.lii  
 
 Using this freedom, the founders are able to construct a governance structure befitting their 
own unique organisational needs. A feature which is particularly valuable in situations where the SE is 
founded by two or more distinct entities with different corporate cultures, distinct modes of operation, 
divergent target markets and clientele. Since each firm 'exhibits its own complexity and business 
environment, market forces, if not disturbed, [it] will choose the system that is most efficient for each 
firm in equilibrium.'liii 
 
Integrationist Approach to Corporate Governance 
 
Employee participation in the SE is governed by the provisions of the SE Directive, which apply 
concomitantly with the provisions of the SE Regulation.liv The provisions of this Directive reflect the 
fact that an agreement between the Member States on a unified model regarding employee 
participation was not a possibility. The disparate and contrasting traditions of the different Member 
States acted as a key obstacle to an accord on this subject matter for many years.lv An illustration of 
this is the presence in Germany of a strict co-determination system,lvi while in the UK there is a 
complete absence of such a mechanism.  
 
After more than three decades of parley, a two-prong solution was opted for which has since 
been incorporated into the SE Directive. This solution is based on two separate principles namely the 
‘before and after’ principle, and the ‘primacy of negotiations’ principle.lvii 
 
According to the ‘before and after’ principle, an SE is required to ‘guarantee its employees the 
same level of protection as enjoyed prior to the adoption of the European Company status’,lviii thereby 
guaranteeing that the establishment of an SE does not involve the disappearance or reduction of 
practices of employee involvement existing within the companies participating in the establishment of 
the SE.lix  
 
Employee participation at board level is only mandated when similar structures previously 
existed within the founding companies.lx Where none of the companies involved in the incorporation 
of the SE was governed by employee participation rules, such rules need not apply to the SE after its 
incorporation.lxi The same approach will apply not only to the initial incorporation of the SE but also 
to any structural changes to an existing SE.  
 
Recourse has also been made to the idea that it is best when the participants themselves agree 
upon the model that is suited to their needs. Consequently Article 13(2) of the SE Directive lays down 
the principle of the ‘primacy of negotiation’.lxii lxiii 
 
Where the management or administrative organs of the companies participating in the 
establishment of the SE are involved in the drawing up of a plan for the establishment of the said SE, 
they are responsible for taking the steps needed to start negotiations with representatives of the 
companies’ employees in order to agree on arrangements for the involvement of employees in the 
SE.lxiv Such steps should be taken as soon as possible after publication of the draft plan.lxv  
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With this in mind, a special negotiating body (SNB) representing the employee in the 
participating companies, and the concerned subsidiaries or establishments must be convened.lxvi The 
SNB is responsible for negotiating the form and extent of employee involvement in the SE, and 
together with the competent organs of the participating companies will be entrusted with deciding by 
written agreement on the plans, and structures for employee involvement within the SE.lxvii  
  
 This system offers certain comparative advantages even though at first glance it may appear as 
if certain companies might not benefit in this context from the SE structure. 
 
Companies are given the option of negotiating employee involvement, which is not only of 
value to the employees and trade unions, but also to the companies themselves, since they are 
effectively offered the opportunity to negotiate a model of employee involvement that is appropriate to 
their distinctive interests, structure and needs,lxviii and to formulate a bespoke solution adapted to their 
unique requirements.lxix 
 
The SE extends the concept of co-determination to Europe, so that co-determination is no 
longer restricted to employees from countries with a co-determination regime.lxx As the SE structure 
extends the concept of employee involvement to all Member States, this concept which strengthens the 
involvement of the workforce in the company can be beneficial to Europe-wide group structures, as 
the mixture of representatives from different Member States can arguably be advantageous to the SE 
in terms of group interest, and group wide decisions.lxxi  
 
 The prospect of freezing pre-existing levels of employee involvement, or even avoiding the 
rules on participation altogether, is an option made available when using the SE structure. In 
accordance with ‘before and after’ principle, the threshold for the regime of employee participation is 
determined exclusively on the basis of the employees that were subject to participation pre-
establishment. Consequently, it can be very interesting for SMEs to restructure themselves as SEs 
before crossing the threshold to a stricter form of employee involvement.lxxii This strategy of using the 
SE form ‘to maintain the same system of employee involvement irrespective of an increase of the 
company’s workforce’lxxiii has apparently been used by German companies in order to retain the same 
level of employee participation in the supervisory board ‘even though the threshold for a national 
company (either 500 or 2,000 employees) would require a change in the board’s worker 
representation.’lxxiv 
 
Even for companies from countries where rules of employee participation do not exist, the SE 
with its ‘low-level’ of employee involvement may present some benefits.lxxv With employees sitting on 
the supervisory board, management is better informed of the internal problems within the company, 
which is advantageous from the point of view of corporate governance.lxxvi Moreover, since employees 
are part of the board, decisions having a negative effect on company employees might be easier to 
implement.lxxvii As such strikes or protests may be avoided.lxxviii 
 
Employee representation the most controversial issue associated with the SE is arguably one 
of its key features and one of the main reasons for multinational companies to opt for an SE. 
The ‘European Flag’lxxix 
At the present time, the SE is one of the sole legal forms available at the European level that is 
governed by a certain degree of unitary and directly applicable law. Notwithstanding the fact that a 
number of issues impacting upon the SE are governed by national law, there is still a certain level of 
legal certainty throughout all companies involved that did not exist before the creation of the SE 
structure.lxxx 
 
Beyond the benefits that are more legal in nature, such as corporate mobility, and the flexible 
corporate governance structure, the ability to use the SE abbreviation also offers certain distinct 
business opportunities. 
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The supranational character, and identity of the SE are strong branding tools for a company or 
group of companies. The inclusion of the abbreviation SE in the name of the undertakingslxxxi 
inevitably means that as SEs they belong to an exclusive class of entities in a league of their own, 
quite apart from other undertakings operating within the European space.lxxxii  
 
Beyond the fact that the SE tag adds a European flavour to the culture, and image of the 
company,lxxxiii this European affiliation is particularly important for companies as it provides them 
with an opportunity to re-brand themselves as European companies, a strategy that arguably offers 
them more visibility than national corporate forms.lxxxivlxxxv  
 
Enhancing the Equity of the Company 
Since the SE is likely to be an entity of stature, not only due to the conditions associated with its 
incorporation but also due to the ongoing obligations to which it is subjected, the formation of the SE 
is likely to send out a positive signal to potential investors and creditors, in turn offering the structure 
increased facilities for the raising of capital in the EU, and beyond.lxxxvi This is particularly important 
since the SE unlike the EEIG is able to raise capital investment from the public.  
 
Flowing on from this, the European label may also have a positive impact on the share price of 
listed companies.lxxxvii 
 
Market Integration in the European Union 
With the possibility of obtaining a specific European corporate identity, the formation of SEs deepens 
the concept of the common European market.lxxxviii  Thus, the SE makes Europe itself more attractive as 
a place to invest.  
 As Commissioner Bolkestein put it ‘This “European identity” of a company will also be a way 
of removing the psychological barriers between Member States and prompt a more European outlook 
on doing business.’lxxxix 
Psychological Benefits 
 
The European affiliation of the structure is beneficial which is of consequence in situations where the 
SE is the product of a cross-border merger or consolidation or in the alternative a restructuring 
operation, in the process of which at least one of the participants is required to forfeit its ‘nationality’ 
in favor of the ‘nationality’ of another.xc Such a move could be a serious hindrance especially when 
the participating companies are more or less equal in size and enjoy significant national standing.xci  
 
 Thanks to the SE structure, national concerns become secondary to the more important 
European concerns. The supranational image of an SE ‘helps to avoid the feeling of a national ‘defeat’ 
of the management and the staff in the absorbed company or previous subsidiaries’xcii whilst affording 
culturally distinct companies the opportunity to dilute if not eliminate an important source of 
tension.xciii  
 
 By using a single European banner, the founding company or companies are able to 
demonstrate that the entity is 'European 'at heart'',xciv highlighting  'the preeminence of its European 
identity over the national identities ... that make up the group',xcv whilst encapsulating the underlying 
corporate ethos and raison d'être of the company.  
 
 Speaking of the decision of the Airbus Group to become an SE, Tom Enders of the Airbus 
Group said that as 'a pioneer of European industrial integration; it is logical and the right time for our 
multinational culture to be reflected in our legal structure.'xcvi 
 
The fact that the SE will not be considered as a 'foreign' entity is likely to mean that it will be 
able to raise capital in all Member States with comparatively more ease than a national entity.xcvii 
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Renvoi and Company Law Arbitrage 
At variance with the intentions of the drafters of the 1970 Proposal who formulated an autonomous 
legal form based purely on European company law, the contemporary SE is a fusion of European law 
and national law. The result is a collection of thirty-one different national variants of the SE.xcviii  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that certain of its characteristicsxcix are governed by EU law, other 
matters associated with the SE are addressed by reference to national law (renvoi technique). Besides 
the evident complexities associated with the renvoi technique,c this technique also offers certain 
benefits.  
 
Due in part to the fact that the SE is a legal form in relation to which there is little to no law 
and experience comparatively with national companies,ci promoters are able to break new ground by 
establishing an SE. Until the establishment of a sufficient number of SEs the renvoi technique may 
limit the risks and high transactional costs associated with the establishment of the SE. 
 
The lack of detailed rules (in the SE Regulation) on issues such as shares coupled with the 
divergencies between the different legal systems arguably means that such matters are left to national 
legislatures to address. This scope of discretion at the national level means that the promoters of the 
SE are able to select the jurisdiction that offers them the most competitive provisions (company law 
arbitrage).cii The renvoi technique accordingly creates the possibility for companies to forum shop in 
order to choose their Member State of registration with specific reference to the benefits offered by the 
said State.ciii  
 
One of the consequences of this state of affairs is the fact that Member States that wish to be 
more competitive for the purpose of attracting leading European and non-European companies will 
have to adapt their legislation in order to better accommodate the specific needs of a European-wide 
legal entity.civ In the long run this state of affairs could lead to convergence amongst the Member 
States with flexibility becoming the norm.cv  
Competitiveness of Companies 
The SE also has the potential of enhancing the competitiveness of companies. What makes a company 
more competitive than its counterparts? The answer is: Divergency.  
 
Bearing in mind the fact that an SE possesses a European character that a national company 
lacks means that arguably comparably with national corporate structures it is better equipped to 
compete not only within the EU but also further afield. 
 
Coupled with this competitive advantage, the SE brand is arguably also a powerful marketing 
tool as investors are generally more likely to invest in companies that are perceived to be modern, 
innovative and future oriented, and arguably in turn sufficiently secure. As companies opting to 
incorporate as SEs are mostly large multinational companies, investors are more likely to invest in a 
European entity rather than its national counterpart.cvi 
 
If the workforce of such multinationals are capable of identifying with, and getting behind this 
European entity they will be better able to work together towards a common goal of advancing their 
company, and its interests.  
 
Lastly, by forming an SE companies may combine their potential, and pool their resources 
under the aegis of a single supranational company governed by one set of framework rules with a 
unified management and reporting system. With cumulative technology and knowledge, the SE will 
become more competitive than national equivalents. 
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Streamlining and Operational Efficiency 
The SE offers underlying entities the prospect of streamlining their respective infrastructures.cvii By 
grouping together operations under the umbrella organisation, European-based businesses are able to 
reduce their operational costs.cviii  
 
By removing the need for costly, and elaborate networks of subsidiaries, such businesses are 
able to make substantial savings. The ability to restructure rapidly and dynamically in a responsive 
fashion affords such entities the ability to capitalise on opportunities as they emerge.cix The SE allows 
for the establishment of a single legal entity with branches, removing the need for a complex network 
of subsidiaries governed by different national lawscx whilst at the same time streamlining operations 
by allowing corporate groups to modify their European group-structure using one single company 
rather than a network of subsidiary companies.cxi  
 
Using one single company, the directors of the SE are no longer required to be involved in the 
corporate governance of a network of European-based subsidiaries. Accordingly, corporate 
governance becomes far more efficient.cxii By employing a single entity with branches, internal and 
external control requirements are centralised to one single entity at the level of the SE in turn 
enhancing operational transparency, reducing transactional costs and improving efficiency.cxiii  
 
As the branches of the SE will be governed by the same body of substantive law, this will also 
have the effect of facilitating financial flows within the group, as the entity will only be answerable to 
the national authority where the SE is registered rather than being obliged to respond to all the national 
authorities where the group has subsidiaries.cxiv 
 
The ability to move from one Member State to another with relative ease, without the need for 
dissolution and re-incorporation, will also mean that entities that utilise this corporate vehicle will 
benefit from optimisation in corporate mobility.cxv 
 
The formation of an SE, and the inherent restructuring of the company associated with its 
formation may lead to rationalisation not only of the organisation but also of employee resources. In 
the case of a merger, for example, administration may be centralised at the level of the SE resulting in 
a reduction in the number of employees needed to run the new company. 
 
 This overall streamlining, and simplification of corporate operations will arguably result in a 
more appealing structure from the point of investors who are likely to prefer a single structure in lieu 
of ‘a series of different companies regulated by different laws.’cxvi  
 
National Treatment 
Member States are obliged to treat an SE ‘as if it were a public limited-liability company formed in 
accordance with the law of the Member State in which it has its registered office.’cxvii In turn, ensuring 
that Member States guarantee that the provisions of domestic law governing SEs do not result in 
discriminatory treatment of SEs resulting from a difference in treatment of European companies when 
compared with national public companies, or in disproportionate restrictions on the formation of a 
European company, or on the transfer of its registered office.cxviii  
 By virtue of the SE Regulation, mutual recognition of SEs in the various Member States is 
guaranteed thus ensuring that an SE validly incorporated under the laws of any one of the Member 
States is assured the same treatment as a public limited liability company validly incorporated under 
the laws of the host Member State.  In this fashion, this Regulation effectively transposes the ruling of 
the CJEU in the Überseering case to SEs.cxix 
As Member States must ensure that the SE is not discriminated against relative to traditional 
national companies this in turn guarantees the application of the traditional EU principles of anti-
discrimination and efficiency.cxx  
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3. The Structural and Functional Flaws of the SE 
 
After having highlighted several of advantages associated with the SE, this section of the article will 
consider some of its shortcomings from the perspective of its intended end-user. 
Accessibility and its Limits 
As the SE cannot to be formed ex-nihilo, it cannot be established directly by individuals.cxxi This 
structure accordingly requires prior incorporation of companies within different Members States. 
 
 This structure is accordingly reserved for companies looking to create an SE by means of a 
merger,cxxii as a holding company,cxxiii or as a subsidiary,cxxivcxxv or alternatively an existing EU-based 
national public company looking to transform into an SE.cxxvi  
 
From the start there have been quite divergent national views on which businesses should be 
allowed to use the SE structure. By way of an illustrationcxxvii  at the time of the formulation of the 
1970 Proposal, the French government were strongly supportive of the view that access to the SE 
should not be made more difficult than access to corresponding national corporate forms, whereas as 
the German government, fearful that businesses would select the SE form over the German corporate 
forms in a bid to circumvent the stringent provisions applicable to the latter forms, endorsed the view 
that SEs should only be made available if certain international factors were present.cxxviii   
 
The upshot of this is that the SE as a corporate vehicle is exclusively reserved for those 
situations where there is a cross-border element present,cxxix where two or more public companies 
incorporated in different Member States intend to form an SE by means of a merger,cxxx or two or 
more (private or public) limited liabilty companies governed by the laws of different Member States 
aim to establish a holdingcxxxi or  subsidiary SE.cxxxii   
 
In order to prevent public companies circumventing the cross-border prerequisite in 
circumstances where such a company aspires to transform itself into an SE,cxxxiii it will need to 
demonstrate a cross-border character by having for at least two years a subsidiary governed by the law 
of another Member State. 
Dual Nationality  
The contemporary SE is a structure created to accommodate the varied concerns of the Member States. 
Prime amongst these is the debate surrounding the question of whether an SE should be a company of 
‘European law’ or rather a ‘European type’ company.cxxxiv In effect whether national laws should be 
harmonised or a supranational corporate form with its own dedicated body of law should be 
introduced.  
 
The SE Regulation as it stands skirt around many of the concerns originally associated with 
the establishment of the European Company. The European authorities have according left Member 
States 'a margin of appreciation to introduce modifications, or have limited themselves to proposing 
instead of imposing’ by allowing for substantive supplementation by express reference to national 
laws or bylaws.cxxxv  
 
Contrary to the intention of the drafters of the 1970 proposal that championed the creation of 
an autonomous legal form based purely on European company law, the contemporary SE is a hybrid 
governed by European law, and national law.cxxxvi  
 
Besides the common, substantive provisions set out in the Regulation, the SE is also governed 
by an array of national provisions.cxxxvii  The SE Regulation contains 70 articles with numerous 
references to national law, and multiple options for Member States. For this reason it is perhaps more 
correct to say that there is no singular model for the SE but rather 31 variations on a theme.  
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Restriction on Mobility 
 
Considering that one of the main advantages of the SE is its cross-border mobility, it is something of a 
paradox that one of the main disadvantages associated with this form is the restriction on its mobility.  
 
 The restrictions affecting use of this feature, and the procedures associated with its use, largely 
undermine the worth of the SE’s ability to engage in reincorporation.cxxxviii  Beyond the possible levy of 
exit taxes, mobility is impeded by procedural, and organisational restraints.cxxxix  
 
Procedural restraints 
 
The complex procedural requirements that must be followed by an SE looking to transfer its seat make 
the cost associated with the relocation prohibitive. This cost may have a dampening effect on mobility 
unless the legal regime in the target Member State is such that it offers ‘significant cost or efficiency 
advantages’.cxl  
 
 The strict procedural rules associated with the transfer of seat, which are intended to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders, employees, and creditors,cxli effectively operate to undermine the 
benefit of the SE as ‘a vehicle for choice of law’ rendering ‘arbitrage between different systems of 
company law less attractive.’cxlii Strategically this position arguably reduces the incentive amongst 
Member States to compete in a bid to attract SEs.cxliii  
 
Organisational restraints 
  
The requirement that the registered office of the SE shall be located in the same Member State as its 
head office, means that the transfer of the registered office of the SE must also involve the transfer of 
its head office.cxlivcxlv Moreover, Member States may limit the discretion of the SE further by insisting 
that the registered and head offices of the SE not only be in the same Member State ‘but also in the 
same place.’cxlvi 
 
 Severe sanctions can be imposed on SEs that deviate from this requirement pursuant to Article 
64 SE Regulation.cxlvii Ultimately an SE that fails to regularise its position is likely to face domestic 
proceedings intended to bring about its liquidation.cxlviii   
 
 The requirement that there is ‘territorial correspondence between registered office and head 
office constitutes a barrier to the recognition of primary establishment and restricts greatly the free 
movement of companies.’cxlix  
 
Employee Participation 
 
The question of employee representation has been a bone of contention from the very start, with the 
various Member States vying for different levels of employee representation. This disagreement 
eventually led to discord with the separate Member States adopting divergent opinions on the 
question.  
 
Referring to this stumbling block in 1971 Paul M Storm states that ‘[u]p to now, the real 
Mitbestimmung is to be found in Germany only ... What if an SE is formed through consolidation of a 
German AG and a French SA? Should the SE have Mitbestimmung or not? If so, Mitbestimmung 
would be introduced into a country where it does not exist and is in fact fiercely opposed by both 
employers and trade' unions (which do not want to take responsibility for "capitalist" management). If 
not, German corporations could escape from the German Mitbestimmung law by forming an SE.’cl 
 
 The current position, according to the SE Directive, is that the formation of an SE is only 
possible after successful completion of negotiations towards employee involvement. No SE may be 
registered unless an agreement or an arrangement for employee involvement has been reached. The 
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procedure set out by this Directive and reviewed above is problematic for a number of reasons. Prime 
amongst these is the procedure involving the creation of the SNB, which can be both time-consuming 
and complex in practice. In the case of groups established in various Member States, the SNB has to 
consist of representatives from each company. Thus, the SNB will be multi-cultural and multi-
geographical representing various interests which may mean that negotiations are intricate, and 
protracted, and that an agreement may not necessarily be reached.cli 
 
 If an agreement cannot be reached, several standard rules exist depending on the form of 
employee involvement in the involved companies pre-formation of the SE.clii Pursuant to the ‘before 
and after’ principle, if no agreement may be reached, the provisions of the company with the most 
severe provisions regarding employee involvement will be applicable to the SE. This principle is 
certainly a deterrent to companies incorporated in Member States with a low level of employee 
involvement or even without any provisions in this regard, and may prevent multinationals from 
forming an SE. 
 
 These rules are also deemed to be disproportionate notably where only a small part of the 
workforce is in fact concerned by the involvement process.cliii An added concern here is the 
requirement that registration of an SE be postponed until completion of negotiations,cliv which is 
especially worrisome for listed companies ‘for whom the certainty of procedures and of the time-
frame for registration is crucial.’clv  
 
Absence of Tax Harmonisation 
 
Since the SE Regulation does not cover taxation,clvi national tax law is applicable. As such an SE must 
be treated as a national company, and each of its subsidiaries or branches is subject to the tax law of 
the country within which it is situated.clvii  
 
 Whilst it is comprehensible why the Member States did not agree on a differential tax 
treatment for the SE; considering that the SE is comparable to a company with a cross-border 
subsidiary or branch, a differentiated treatment of the SE would have arguably represented an 
infringement of the non-discrimination principle enshrined in EU law,clviii the lack of a specific tax 
regime for SEs, and the absence of tax harmonisation across the EU together constitute serious 
impediments from the point of view of the SE. Referring to the concerns of the Commission in this 
regard, Commissioner Bolkestein states that  
 
The Commission was always determined to include tax provisions in the Statute. The relevant 
articles in the original proposal of 1970 were very complete. In the 1989 proposal, these 
comprehensive rules were reduced to just one provision on the taxation of the permanent 
establishments of the SE. In the negotiations running up to the final agreement on the statute, 
however, even this reference was removed. Member States considered that the tax questions 
relating to the SE should be considered separately. This leaves the SE-Statute without any tax 
rules. This is a rather unfortunate situation, which I regret very much. Clearly, the lack of 
appropriate tax rules significantly reduces the practical attractiveness of the European 
Company Statute. Business representatives emphasise this quite forcefully.clix 
 
 Erik Werlauff refers to taxation of SEs as one of the matters that the SE Regulation could have 
dealt with, which would have taken the European Union a step further towards its goal of ‘genuine 
European harmonisation of company law which will allow a cross-border company or group to draw 
up a uniform, transnational plan in terms of company law.’clx In this regard, Erik Werlauff suggests 
that the integration friendly organs (inter alia the European Parliament) could have wished to see 
uniform taxation of SEs both with respect to tax base (the calculation of taxable income), and tax 
rate.clxi  
 
Whilst the question of taxation is not addressed in the SE Regulation, this matter is addressed 
in detail in the 1970 Proposal. By formulating a comprehensive statute for European Companies, the 
drafters of the Proposal had hoped to provide companies operating in the Community with a range of 
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solutions to the raft of potential problems that they may face in future,clxii allowing such entities to 
adapt ‘their legal structure to the dimensions and the needs of the European market’, whilst permitting 
them to live ‘not under nine national laws but under one European Company Statute.’clxiii   
 
With fourteen distinct and detailed titles, the 1970 Proposal is designed to govern all aspects 
of an SE’s activity without the need of the intervention of national legislatures.clxiv Whilst Title XII on 
taxation rules out the possibility of introducing dedicated tax provisions for European Companies,clxv it 
does recognise the importance of addressing the unique fiscal problems such companies are likely to 
encounter.clxvi The Proposal groups these concerns into three categories, namely those arising 1) at the 
time of formation, 2) during the lifetime of the company (concerning its status for tax purposes, and 
the method used to tax its profits), and 3) in relation to the tax domicile of the company.clxvii 
 
On the question of indirect taxation on the capital raised on establishment, the Proposal makes 
reference to generally applicable instruments of European law addressing this particular issue,clxviii and 
highlights the importance of ensuring that the exchange of shares (required for the formation of a 
European holding company)clxix 'not give rise to any charge to tax.'clxx  
 
The Proposal also suggests that 'the profits of a permanent establishment are taxable solely by 
the State in which that establishment is located'clxxi whilst allowing companies 'to opt for taxation of 
their profits computed on a world-wide basis'clxxii so losses incurred by such establishments abroad can 
be deducted in the country of domicile for tax purposes.clxxiii 
 
The question of tax domicile and the related matter of a change to this domicile are both 
addressed within the 1970 Proposal.clxxiv  
 
Since a European Company is likely to operate in more than one Member State, the Proposal 
highlights the importance of ensuring that it have only one domicile for tax purposes,clxxv for the 
purpose of determining the system of tax law applicable to the distribution of profits, the income 
generated by investments in companies in third countries, and the profits earned in such countries.clxxvi  
 
The determination of the tax domicile of a European Company is addressed by the 
Proposal,clxxvii which states that the SE 'shall be treated as resident in the Member State in which the 
centre of its effective management is located.'clxxviii   
 
The mobility of European Companies is protected by removing tax obstacles that could hinder 
planned transfers.clxxix After a minimum period of five years' residence for tax purposes in one Member 
State (preventing potential abuse), the Proposal provides for transfers to be made free from tax 
liability.clxxx  
 
The complexity and detailed substance of the 1970 Proposal, and the fact it encroaches upon 
areas of law traditionally seen as the preserve of national legislatures (such as tax law), meant that it 
did not take long before the first difficulties started to become apparent. Coupled with disagreements 
upon the participation of workers, the Member States were unable to reach consensus, and the 1970 
Proposal was finally rejected.  
 
4. Time to Start Over? 
 
The genesis of the European Company captured the zeitgeist of the post-war era. Infused with 
potential, and promise this entity captured the kinetic energy of the integrationist movement that 
epitomised the Communities during the period leading up to the late 1960s.  
 
Confronted with segmentation along political lines, the ethos underlying this structure was 
compromised, and in the process, its foundations severely enfeebled. To ensure that the SE is an 
attractive option, it is important that we revisit this structure.  
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Though the Commission should draw inspiration from the flexibility made available to 
national corporate forms,clxxxi one should not forget that this entity is supranational, and as such 
distinct from domestic entities. Its untapped potential lies in its uniqueness. 
 
With this in mind, it is imperative that we consider this structure as a vehicle for business. By 
considering the interests of businesses, we should be better able to develop the structure available 
addressing the specific needs of those that would hope to use it.  
 
A later transformation into an SE has a major dampening effect, since such a move entails 
transactional costs, difficulties, and risks, especially when bearing in mind the rules on employee 
participation. By allowing an SE to be formed ex-nihilo, entrepreneurs looking to incorporate are 
likely to consider this form alongside national alternatives, increasing the competitiveness of this 
structure, and enhancing its take-up as a corporate vehicle. 
 
By removing the cross-border component, companies will be able to access this structure with 
ease, ensuring organic development of the business, and access to the SE as a precursor to expansion 
and a tool in the expansion.  
 
The need for more comprehensive European level provisions governing SEs, especially on the 
question of taxation, is arguably beneficial to business. However it is also worthwhile considering the 
value of renvoi in this context. A removal of national divergence will not only result in an erosion of 
autonomy at the national level (which is likely to block, or at least delay, reform of the law) but may 
also have a negative impact on business. By taking away the ability of nations to compete for inward 
investment, we are also likely to compromise the interests of businesses that are reliant on this race. 
The solution here could be to introduce more European level regulation on key issues, whilst leaving 
pockets of national discretion in a bid to guarantee internal competition amongst Member States.  
 
 Taxation of SEs is a concern and rightly so. Using the ideas put forth by the drafters of the 
1970 Proposal, it would be sensible to consider the introduction of rules governing taxation of the SE 
during its lifecycle, and addressing the question of tax domicile. In order to preserve inter-state 
competition, tax rate could be a matter to be detemined by Member States individually. Erik Werlauff 
proposes the introduction of uniform rules ‘under which the tax authorities of the home state were to 
compute the income for the entire group, including cross-border elements, levy the tax (based on 
different rates from state to state if necessary) which the entire group was to pay, and then distribute 
the tax to each of the states involved.’clxxxii 
 
 
 Employee participation offers certain benefits to the participating company or companies, its 
employees, and trade unions. In contrast, the procedures relating to the negotiation of such 
participation are usually protracted and complex, offering no guarantee of an agreement, and 
undermining the economic position of the parties involved (founder/s, and its/their stakeholders 
including employees and trade unions). Whilst the 'before and after' principle offers some relief, 
perhaps now is the time to reassess this requirement. Bearing in mind the value of employee 
participation (reviewed above), it is arguably important that the negotiation procedure be simplified, 
and streamlined. 
 
A final issue to be considered is the requirement that the head and registered offices of the SE 
are located in the same Member State. By removing this requirement, SEs will enjoy the freedom to 
adapt their business to internal needs (the need for efficiency, streamlining, sourcing of new assets, 
and so forth), and external changes (including market conditions, the globalisation process, and 
competition). 
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